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INTRODUCTION

The Fourth Amendment is included in the United States Bill of Rights to
guarantee an individual's right to privacy.' Fourth Amendment protections
consequently require law enforcement officers to secure a search warrant,
justified by probable cause, to conduct lawful searches and seizures.2
However, there are several exceptions to the warrant requirement. 3 The
border search exception is one of these exceptions, permitting officers to
lawfully screen individuals at an international border without probable cause
or a warrant, so long as the search is reasonable. 4
On August 25, 2009, the United States Department of Homeland Security
(hereinafter "DHS") issued a Privacy Impact Assessment (hereinafter
"PIA") mandating that travelers entering or exiting a United States border or
its functional equivalent, such as an airport, would be subject to a search of
their electronic devices by Customs Border Protection (hereinafter "CBP")
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (hereinafter "ICE") officers for

1. See generally Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment: "Second to None in

the Bill of Rights, " 30 ADVOCATE 5 1987) (reiterating the importance of the Fourth
Amendment, explaining that the Amendment determines the kind of society in which we
live, and is second to the Bill of Rights).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating, "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause").
3. See generally Jeanette Doran Brooks, Valid Searches and Seizures Without
Warrants, INST. OF GOV'T (Nov. 2004) (explaining the different exceptions to the warrant
rule such as: (1) Exigent circumstances; (2)Search incident to arrest; (3) Automobile
searches; (4) Consent searches; (5) Border searches; 6) Open fields; (7) Plain view, and
(8) Special needs).
4. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 606-07 (1977) (explaining the
purpose of the border search exception: to protect the sovereign).
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the purpose of maintaining national security.5 Circuit courts have interpreted
DHS's policy differently when determining the level of suspicion required
for officers to conduct lawful electronic device searches at the border.6
Specifically, circuit courts are split as to whether reasonable or
individualized suspicion is needed to lawfully conduct forensic electronic
device searches at the border. Generally, officers conduct two types of
searches at the border: routine or manual searches of electronic devices and
forensic searches of electronic devices, commonly referred to as nonroutine
searches.8 Manual searches of electronic devices at the border allow officers
to unlock a traveler's electronic device and scroll through their personal
contact list, call log, messages, emails, and browsing history without
requiring any level of suspicion as a prerequisite. 9 Forensic searches of
electronic devices are conducted away from the border and allow officers to
connect a traveler's electronic device to external equipment that extracts
stored information from the device.' 0 The forensic search allows officers to

5. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/
about (last visited Sept. 27, 2018) (explaining that ICE's mission is to promote homeland
security and public safety through the criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws
governing border control, customs, trade and immigration); see also U.S. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE BORDER SEARCHES OF

ELECTRONIC DEVICES (Sept. 27, 2018, 10:17 PM), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/privacy~pia cbp laptop.pdf (addressing a new policy that allows CBP
officers to conduct electronic device searches at U.S borders and port-of-entries); see
also U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, IMMIGRATION INSPECTION PROGRAM
(last modified Feb. 21, 2014), https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/
overview27, 2018 (explaining CBP officers determine the admissibility of individuals
seeking entry into the United States at port-of-entries).
6. See generally Another Circuit Weighs in on Border Search Authority in Creating
Circuit Split, CROWELL.COM (May 25, 2018), https://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/
AlertsNewsletters/all/Another-Circuit-Weighs-in-on-Border-Search-AuthorityCreating-Circuit-Split/pdf [hereinafter "Another Circuit"] (giving an overview of the
circuit split decisions and a breakdown of the CBP 2017 statistics of warrantless
electronic device searches at the border).
7. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 133 (4th Cir. 2018) (referring to
circuit cases that disagree on the legal standard of the border search exception).
8. See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION: CBP DIRECTIVE No. 3340-049A,
BORDER SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES (Jan. 4, 2018) (explaining the difference
between a "basic" search and "advanced" search. Note, basic searches are also referred
to as manual or routine search; an advance search is also referred to as forensic, extended
or nonroutine searches).
9. See id. (stating that during a basic search, an officer may analyze information
encountered at the border).
10. See id. (explaining that even if a forensic search is conducted away from the
border, the search is still valid because most port-of-entries are not sourced with forensic
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review, copy, and analyze contents of an electronic device without needing
a warrant." While DHS maintains that a reasonable suspicion standard
governs the forensic search, various circuit courts conclude differently when
determining whether an individualized, reasonable, or no suspicion standard
applies. 12
This Comment argues that the Eleventh Circuit's approach to analyzing
forensic electronic device searches at the border is inconsistent with the
Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches because the
court's standard does not require any level of suspicion for electronic device
searches and thus, denies privacy protections guaranteed to individuals. 3
Part II examines the relationship between the government interest in
promoting national security and an individual's fundamental right to privacy
during manual and forensic searches at the border.14 Part III argues that the
Eleventh Circuit's lack of any level of suspicion for forensic electronic
device searches at the border violates the Fourth Amendment because
electronic devices store an individual's private and personal information,
triggering fundamental privacy protections. 15 Part IV recommends that
circuit courts conform to a uniform, objective standard when conducting
electronic device border searches by adopting the individualized suspicion
standard used in United States v. Kolsuz. 1 6 Part V concludes that the
Eleventh Circuit's approach in not requiring any level of suspicion to
conduct electronic device border searches is unconstitutional and reiterates
the need for circuit courts to uniformly apply an individualized suspicion

equipment).
11. See id. (explaining that forensic searches are more advanced and are mandated
to be performed in the presence of a supervisor).
12. See id. (explaining that officers are allowed to perform an advanced search where
there is reasonable suspicion such that there is a threat to national security).
13. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014) (reiterating and agreeing that
the "ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness' (citing Brigham
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006))).
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasizing the fundamental right to protect one's
self); see generally United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 891 (1975) (emphasizing that
the purpose of the Fourth Amendment "is to protect liberty and privacy from arbitrary
and oppressive interference by government officials"); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 350 (1967) (reiterating the constitutional basis of the Fourth Amendment "person's
general right to privacy ...

to be let alone").

15. See infra Part III (demonstrating the courts should develop a stream-lined
procedure and process for border searches that are not subjective based on CBP officers).
16. See infra Part IV (explaining that the Supreme Court has the power to overturn
the Eleventh Circuit's application of the Fourth Amendment along the border while
conducting electronic device searches).
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standard when conducting these types of searches.17
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

The FourthAmendment Right to Privacy and the Border Search
Exception

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures
against one's person, property, and effects.' 8 A court needs to analyze the
reasons for initiating the search and the scope of the search to determine
reasonableness.' 9 Evolving caselaw has determined that border officials may
lawfully conduct searches without a warrant so long as the search is
reasonable. 20 Reasonable suspicion requires border officials to have reason
or cause to suspect that contraband exists in the particular place being
searched.2' On the other hand, individualized suspicion is centralized on law
enforcement officers making judgments based on a person's unique actions,
character, and situation.22 Individualized suspicion is designed to eliminate
assumptions based on stereotypes, race, religion, and socio-economic
background.2 3
The increase in technology has led to controversy in the legality of border
searches involving electronic devices under the Fourth Amendment.24 Under
17. See infra Part IV (concluding that the Supreme Court should review and extend
their Riley decision to searches of electronic devices at the border).
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating, "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause").
19. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (stating that searches conducted without a warrant are
unlawful).
20. See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1229 (1 1th Cir. 2018) (concluding
with precedent that border searches are part of the warrantless exception rule and do not
require anything else but reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of an electronic device
at the border).
21. See United States v. Vega-Bravo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1351-52 (1lth Cir. 1984)
(Hatchett, J., dissenting) (explaining that the reasonable suspicion standard is usually
used when a subject behaves in a suspicious manner).
22. See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, What is Probable Cause, and Why Should We
Care? The Costs, Benefits, and Meaning of Individualized Suspicion, 73 L. AND
CONTEMP. PROB. 145 (2010) (explaining that individualized suspicion and probable
cause are synonymous).
23. See id. (reiterating that individualized suspicion requires examining both
reasonable suspicion and probable cause).
24. See Riley v. California, 537 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (holding that a warrantless
digital search of a person's cell phone is unconstitutional and violates the Fourth
Amendment); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332,332 (2009) (holding that the search
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the border search exception, CBP officers are allowed to conduct warrantless
25
searches of travelers and their belongings to protect national security.
The border search exception to the Fourth Amendment first emerged in
United States v. Ramsey.26 In Ramsey, the defendant transported drugs into
the United States via mail. 2
The Supreme Court concluded that mail
entering the United States is subject to the border search exception. 28 The
Court reasoned that the sole purpose of the border search exception is to
29
protect the sovereign and thus, the mode of transportation does not matter.
Merely crossing the border is sufficient for an officer to conduct a lawful
30
search without needing probable cause or a warrant.
In United States v. Kolsuz, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
individualized suspicion is necessary when conducting a forensic search of
31
electronic devices at the border because these searches are highly intrusive.
In Kolsuz, border patrol detained the defendant at Washington Dulles Airport

of a defendant's vehicle while handcuffed in a patrol car was unreasonable; even though
the facts of this case are different from the typical electronic device search cases, it is
still applicable because most travelers who are stopped at the border feel as though they
cannot "freely" remove themselves from a CBP officer); United States v. Kolsuz, 890
F.3d 133, 133 (4th Cir. 2018) (explaining that a forensic search of a traveler's electronic
device at the border is only permissible if the officer has reasonable suspicion).
25. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, INSPECTION OF ELECTRONIC
DEVICES, PUB. No. 0294-0709, https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
inspection-electronic-devices-tearsheet.pdf (explaining that under 8 U.S.C. § 1357 and
19 U.S.C. §§ 1499, 1581, 1582, CBP officers are responsible for identifying possible
foreign and domestic threats through a series of questions, searches, and seizures).
26. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 606-07 (1977) (holding that customs
inspector had reasonable cause to suspect that there was merchandise or contraband in
the envelopes).
27. See id. at 609 (describing the transcontinental transportation of drugs into the
United States by the defendant. Noting that the envelopes were heavier and fatter than
regular mail).
28. See id. at 607 (stating that when mail crosses the border, probable cause is not
needed to search the contents of the mail).
29. See id. at 606-07 (explaining that the border search exception is grounded in the
recognized duty to protect the sovereign; moreover, the border exception is not an
extension of the exigency doctrine).
30. See id at 618. (emphasizing that entering [and exiting] the country makes a
resulting search "reasonable").
31. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 137-38 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing United
States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 153, 152 (2004)) (emphasizing that "individualized
suspicion" is necessary for forensic border searches of a cell phone); see also Riley v.
California, 573 U.S. 373, 393-94, 396-97 (2014) (noting that searching a cell phone is
almost comparable to searching one's home).
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while attempting to board an international flight to Turkey in 2016.32 Before
the border officers searched the defendant's electronic devices, the officers
searched his luggage, revealing restricted firearm parts.33 After the border
patrol searched the defendant's luggage, he admitted that he was transporting
firearm parts without a license and the officers arrested him.3 4 The court
noted that the arrest did not preclude the border search exception because the
defendant was at the functional equivalent to a border, the airport. 35 Prior to
his arrest, Kolsuz was well-known to government authorities; in 2012 and
2013 agents found illegal firearm parts in his luggage while traveling
between Miami and Turkey.36 On both occasions, agents explained to him
that he needed to comply with the licensing requirements to transport such
equipment.
In 2016, CBP agents used Kolsuz's history and his third
attempt to cross the border with illegal contraband as sufficient evidence to
forensically search his electronic devices. 38 The court concluded that CBP's
forensic search was based on individualized suspicion because they had
"good" reason to support their notion that Kolsuz was attempting to export
39
illegal contraband, the paramount basis for the border search exception.
Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit concluded that border patrol needs
reasonable suspicion, rather than individualized suspicion to conduct a
forensic search.40
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
individualized suspicion is not required for border searches involving

32. See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 139 (explaining that the defendant had been warned twice
before his arrest of the mandatory requirements for transporting firearms).
33. See id. at 139 (explaining that because of the defendant's prior history, an email
was sent to airport agents alerting them to be aware that the same illegal transportation
of goods could occur).
34. See id. (noting that Agent Cogan and Budd found 18 handguns barrels, calibers,
and a conversion kit).
35. See id. at 143 (stating that regardless of Kolsuz's arrest, the border search
exception still applies because he was exiting the functional equivalent of a border).
36. See id. at 140 (providing the history of Kolsuz to help show that he was prewarned of the required license twice before his actual arrest).
37. See id. at 140-41(showing that regardless of the warnings, Kolsuz had the intent
to continue transporting illegal goods at the border).
38. See id. at 140-41 (explaining that the forensic search revealed a 900-page report
of Kolsuz's electronic device history).
39. See id. at 143 (stating that Kolsuz's history shows that he intended to violate the
protection of the United States therefore, he posed a national security risk).
40. See United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2011), aff'd on
reh 'g, 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (stating that the CBP officers relied
on ICE's confirmation that electronic media can be searched without individualized
suspicion).
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electronic devices because ICE published an official memorandum
reaffirming that officers may seize electronic media at the border without
having individualized suspicion.4' In sharp contrast to both the Fourth and
Ninth Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that CBP officers do not
need to justify any form of electronic device search at the border, and thus,
42
no reasonable or individualized suspicion is required.
B.

The Eleventh Circuit

Traditionally, law permitted warrantless border searches simply because
they occurred at the border. 43 However, technology advances have changed
this rhetoric.44 In UnitedStates v. Touset, the defendant made several money
transfers from a Western Union account to a Philippines-based phone
number to further sex tourism and child pornography in the country. 45 Law
enforcement became aware of the defendant's illegal engagements via
private investigations.4 6 While at the border, the CBP officers manually
inspected the defendant's electronic devices, but no child pornography was
found.4 The officers seized and searched the defendant's two laptops and
external hard drives. 48 The defendant argued that forensic searches of
41. See id. (stating customs officers acted presumptively without considering the
level of suspicion because they relied on ICE's manual for reaffirmation that
individualized suspicion was not needed).
42. See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1229 (11th Cir. 2018) (arguing that
the courts' precedent on border searches makes clear that no suspicion is necessary to
search electronic devices at the border).
43. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 611 (1977) (reiterating the standard
of protecting government interests and preventing national security risks at the border).
44. See U.S. Customs and Border Protection: CBP Directive No. 3340-049A, supra
note 8 (explaining that as the use of technology increases, so does the strictness of our
border laws).
45. See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1230 (providing additional detail about the investigations
conducted against Touset: Touset made frequent low money transfers and created an
"iloveyousomuch0820@yahoo.com" email account to document his transfers to clients
in child pornography).
46. See id. at 1230 (stating that several private organizations and government
agencies investigated Touset's whereabouts and suggested that he had been involved
with the transportation of child pornography. These organizations included "Xoom" and
Cyber Center investigation team).
47. See id. (asserting that even though through a manual search no contraband was
found, the agents still conducted a forensic search without having reasonable suspicion).
48. See id. (noting that CBP Officer Escobar did not find traces of child pornography
when he performed a manual inspection of Touset's two iPhones, a camera, and two
tablets. Escobar returned the items to Touset and sent the additional electronic devices
to a different agency to perform a forensic search).
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electronic devices required reasonable suspicion. 49 The Eleventh Circuit
rejected the defendant's argument, and ruled that no form of suspicion is
required to search electronic devices at the border. 50 The court followed the
reasoning in Ramsey by concluding that searches at the border are reasonable
when CBP agents have knowledge of illegal goods crossing a United States
border or its functional equivalent. 51 For example, both Ramsey and Touset
involved defendants having a history with a country that was known to traffic
either illegal narcotics (Ramsey) or child pornography (Touset). 52 Moreover,
the Ramsey Court concluded that by now, it is not necessary to require any
additional explanation for suspicionless border searches because it only
matters that they occur at the border.53
In Touset, the court created a three-part test to determine whether a search
was intrusive.54 To find that a search is intrusive, there must be: 1) physical
contact between the searcher and person; 2) exposure of intimate body parts;
and 3) use of force.55
C. The Ninth Circuit
In 2013, the Ninth Circuit reheard United States v. Cotterman, a case in
which the government had a lookout alert on the defendant for child
pornography and molestation.56 CBP agents conducted two searches at the
border.5 The first search included a vehicle search, during which the agents

49. See id. (stating that Touset relied on the Supreme Court's holding in their Riley
v. Californiadecision).

50. See id. at 1229 (relying on the border exception to the Fourth Amendment).
51. See id. (explaining that the sole purpose of the border exception is to protect
against national security risks).
52. See id. at 1232 (reiterating that border searches are different; officers are required
to prevent contraband from entering the border).
53. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (explaining that the
suspicionless border searches has been a long-standing right of the sovereign; therefore,
no further explanation is needed).
54. See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (listing the elements that are most prevalent to
identify whether a person's dignity was violated).
55. See id. (emphasizing that these elements help to identify whether a forensic
search was intrusive).
56. See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that
Howard Cotterman was a registered sex offender in the state of California, and was
convicted for two counts of sexual misconduct against a minor).
57. See id. at 957-58 (stating that the first search fell within the Fourth Amendment
border exception, and therefore the second search was just an extension of the first search
even though it was performed away from the border).
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discovered two laptop computers and three digital cameras. 58 The second
59
search involved manual inspection of the defendant's electronic devices.
The search did not reveal any child pornography on the devices, mainly
because the electronic devices were password protected. 60 At this time, the
CBP agent seized the defendant's laptop for a forensic search, which was
conducted 170 miles away from the original border search. 61 The defendant
offered to help the CBP Agent unlock the computer by providing the
password, but the Agent refused because she feared that the defendant would
tamper with the evidence.62 The Ninth Circuit concluded that CBP agents
must have reasonable suspicion before administering a forensic search of an
electronic device at the border. 63 The court reasoned that while the border
search exception's purpose is to protect government interests, reasonable
suspicion is needed so that the government cannot seize property on a
"whim" for an indefinite period of time.64
D. The Fourth Circuit
Given the extensiveness of a forensic electronic device search, the Fourth
Circuit takes the Ninth Circuit's holding one step further by concluding that
officers must have individualized suspicion before conducting device
searches of forensic electronics at the border.65 In Kolsuz, CBP officers

58. See id. at 957; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1433(b) (2010) (noting that vehicles entering
the United States are subject to an inspection and detention if necessary).
59. See id. (explaining that the agent used Cotterman's history of transporting child
pornography to justify the manual search of his electronic device).
60. See CBP DIRECTIVE No. 3340-049, at 5.3.2.2 Technical Assistance
With or
Without Reasonable Suspicion, (Aug. 25,2009) (acknowledging that during an electronic
device search, officers may encounter technical issues such as password protection that
require them to transmit copies of information for further federal agency assistance).
61. See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 956 (noting that the original search at the border did
not uncover any incriminating material).
62. See id. at 958 (finding that Agent Riley had three concerns: (1) Cotterman could
delete the files, without her knowledge; (2) laptops might be "booby trapped"; and (3)
she would be unable to access files).
63. See id. at 968 (finding that the intrusive nature of forensic searches created a
reasonable suspicion requirement); United States v. Alfonso, 759 F.2d 728, 734 (9th Cir.
1985) (holding that the "extended border searches must be justified by 'reasonable
suspicion').
64. See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 957 (showing the court's reluctance to equate the
border exception as an "anything goes" policy).
65. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 144 (4th Cir. 2018) (stating that
individualized suspicion is a higher requirement to meet and focuses on how intrusive
the search was).

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol27/iss4/3

10

De Leon: What Matters More: Preserving a Fundamental Right to Privacy or T
2019]

PRESERVING A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT To PRIVACY

563

detained a Turkish national when they found firearm parts in his luggage as
he attempted to cross the border.66 Upon the defendant's arrest, the agents
seized the defendant's smartphone and performed a month-long forensic
search. 67 The Government asserted that the thirty-day forensic search was
lawful because it had reasonable suspicion that a crime had already occurred
or was about to occur. 68 The defendant argued that the forensic search was
unconstitutional because the government performed the search without a
warrant. 69 The defendant further argued that because the government
conducted the forensic search away from the border, the law should exclude
it from the exception. 7 0 The Fourth Circuit held that CBP agents are
permitted to conduct electronic device searches at the border-conditioned
upon the agents having individualized suspicion; and, in Cotterman, the
agents' reliance on the firearm parts provided sufficient evidence of potential
criminal activity based on individualized suspicion. 1
Furthermore, the court agreed with Cotterman's reasoning that a search's
proximity to the border is irrelevant and does not bar the search. 2

III. ANALYSIS
A. The Eleventh CircuitImproperly InterpretedandApplied the
Reasonable Suspicion Standard to ForensicElectronic Device Border
Searches by Failingto Require Officers to Have Any Level of Suspicion to
Perform These Searches, Which Violates an Individual's Fundamental
Privacy Rights.
Under the border exception to the Fourth Amendment, an officer may
7
lawfully conduct a search at the border so long as the search is reasonable. 1
66. See id. at 139 (explaining that defendant tried to smuggle firearms out of the
country without a license).
67. See id. at 141 (noting that the defendant was in custody for the duration of the
forensic search).
68. See id. at 143 (noting that the district court emphasized that a "nonroutine" search
of electronic devices at the border is justified by reasonable suspicion).
69. See id. at 142 (explaining that if the border search exception did not apply to this
search, standard Fourth Amendment rules would apply).
70. See id. (noting the courts' holding that regardless of distance and proximity to
the border, the border search exception still applies).
71. See id. at 143-44 (asserting that forensic border search of cell phones must be
treated as a nonroutine border search which is permissible only upon showing of
individualized suspicion).
72. See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 142 (stating that a forensic border search can be
conducted days after a manual search and miles away from the border).
73. See CBP DIRECTIVE No. 3340-049A, supra note 8 (explaining the expectation
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In Touset, the Eleventh Circuit held that officers can perform forensic4
electronic device searches at the border without any level of suspicion.
While the Eleventh Circuit does not address manual electronic device border
searches, it unconstitutionally determined that officers conducting forensic
searches of electronic devices at the border never require reasonable or
individualized suspicion. Applying the new standard, in United States v.
Vergara, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that officers conducting forensic
searches of electronic devices at the border do not require probable cause or
a warrant. 6 The Eleventh Circuit's reasoning relies on its precedent and the
First Congress's intended purpose of the Fourth Amendment. 7 7 According
to the Eleventh Circuit, the First Congress empowered customs officials to
conduct warrantless stops and searches of any vessel or cargo suspected
of
7
transporting illegal goods at the border or its functional equivalent. 8
The Eleventh Circuit fails to consider the significance and connection
between modem electronic devices and a traveler's right to privacy at the
border. 79 The Eleventh Circuit's legal standard is inconsistent with the
Fourth Amendment because it fails to recognize that cell phones, computers,
and other electronic devices require the same Fourth Amendment protections
as a home.80
Presently, most people store all of their personal and
that CBP agents use their protocol manual to determine whether the reasonable standard
has been met).
74. See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1233 (1lth Cir. 2018) (stating that
the Fourth Amendment does not require any suspicion for forensic searches of electronic
devices at the border), see also United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1310 (11th Cir.
2018) (asserting that the border search exception allows for a lower standard of
reasonable suspicion).
75. See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (citing United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616
(1977)) (distinguishing searches of property from searches of one's person).
76. See Vergara, 884 F.3d at 1312 (stating that the Court's rhetoric has existed long
before the Fourth Amendment and only searches that are "highly intrusive" to the body
require a reasonable suspicion requisite).
77. See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1236 (explaining that the Eleventh Circuit relies on
precedent to conclude that warrantless forensic searches of electronic devices are
permissible at the border because they are not highly intrusive nor bodily).
78. See id. (stating that the Eleventh Circuit relies heavily on the historical
importance of Congress's intention to create a border search exception, even when
electronic devices were not popularly used or even invented).
79. See id. at 1233 (stating that a traveler's right to be left alone does not prevent the
search of traveler's luggage and materials).
80. Compare id. (reiterating that the Eleventh Circuit does not distinguish between
border searches of different kinds of property) with United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d
133, 145 (4th Cir. 2018) (explaining that electronic devices that contain highly personal
information are ubiquitous and require Fourth Amendment protection).
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professional information on a portable electronic device and thus, courts
should consider it as an "effects" under the Fourth Amendment's privacy
protections. 81
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly concludes that a forensic
search of an electronic device at the border is not intrusive.82 The court
reasons that because a forensic electronic device search does not involve an
agent touching or exposing the suspect's body parts, the search is not
intrusive.83 The Eleventh Circuit's application of the legal standard violates
the Fourth Amendment because it allows officers to subjectively determine
when to conduct a forensic search without ever having reasonable
suspicion.8 4 Instead, the court relies solely on the notion that the border
search exception emerged to protect government interests only.8 5 The
court's reasoning disregards an individual's privacy rights under the Fourth
86

Amendment.

Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit's suspicionless border search standard
is not inclusive nor practical to apply.8 7 The court fails to realize the intimate
relationship between a traveler and his electronic device.88 Electronic

81. See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 145-46 (citing Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 400
(2014)) (highlighting the differences between cell phones and other kinds of property);
see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating, "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause").
82. See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233-34 (using the court's precedent to conclude that a
search of a person's body is the only kind of search that requires individual suspicion).
83. See id. at 1234; Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014) (explaining that
under the search incident-to-arrest doctrine, an additional search of one's pocket bears
no additional privacy intrusion but searching one's digital devices has a substantially
greater privacy interest and thus a higher level of intrusion).
84. See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1237 (noting that while reasonable suspicion is based on
an objective inquiry, reasonable suspicion is not required for searches of electronics at
the border).
85. See id. at 1235 (stating that the court is unpersuaded that an individual's right to
privacy is not given more weight than the paramount interest of the sovereign).
86. See id. at 1233 (re-asserting that not even the Supreme Court has required
reasonable suspicion to search a traveler's property at the border). But cf Riley, 573 U.S.
at 396-97, 2491 (noting that searches of cell phones implicate different privacy concerns
than searches of property like luggage because electronic devices may contain more
information than would even be found in a typical search of a home).
87. See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1228 (reasoning that although many people own
electronic devices, forensic searches of devices are not intrusive because the device is
property, not a traveler's person or body).
88. See id. at 1233 (comparing the information contained on cell phones to that
contained in "a tractor-trailer loaded with boxes of documents").
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devices store vast amounts of information and a cell phone search exposes
the government to far more information than the most intrusive search of a
house.89 The attachment between a traveler and his electronic device is
significant for Fourth Amendment purposes because the traveler may store
information that could potentially expose his family and profession. 90 A
suspicionless forensic search of this information can result in harmful
consequences. 9 1 For example, Justice Sotomayor emphasized in her Riley
concurrence that cell phones store large amount of applications, that when
forensically searched, can reveal information about an individual's religion,
GPS location, and other personal information that officers can use against
92
the person to stereotype.
1. The Eleventh CircuitDisregardedits own Definition of
"Intrusiveness" by Failingto Apply it to Electronic Device Border
Searches and thus, Violated the Fourth Amendment.
The Eleventh Circuit broadly construes precedent to conclude that both
manual and forensic border searches are reasonable without suspicion simply
because the search occurs at the border. 93 For example, the Eleventh Circuit
uses the holding in United States v. Altaro-Moncada to justify manual and
forensic border searches by concluding that national security interests
outweigh a traveler's right to privacy. 94 The Eleventh Circuit reasons that
such searches can prevent issues of national security. 95
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit justifies the minimization of individual

89. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 395-97 (citing Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010))
(noting that today, more than 90% of American adults own cell phones that host mundane
and intimate details and records that, until recently, were much more difficult for law
enforcement to access).
90. See id. at 395 (comparing a personal diary a decade ago with a cell phone today);
United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 145 (4th Cir. 2018) (explaining that electronic
devices contain information such as business documents and medical records).
91. See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 145 (noting that electronic devices store uniquely
sensitive information that contain intimate details about one's life).
92. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 395-96 (explaining that apps provide a comprehensive
record of a person's public movements and affiliations that reveal information about a
person's life).
93. See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1228, 1232 (asserting that the border exception has
complications because of routine and nonroutine searches and the consequences of each).
94. See United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 728 (11th Cir. 2010)
(concluding that there is a qualitative balance that exists when the Fourth Amendment is
used to balance the international border and the interior of the United States).
95. See id. at 728 (stating that the United States' paramount responsibility is to
protect the sovereign, its territory, and integrity).
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privacy rights at the border by emphasizing that a traveler's desire to enter
the United States is a privilege. 96 Therefore, travelers should understand that
their personal effects, which includes electronic devices, are subject to a
forensic search at the border without an officer needing any form of
suspicion.9
The Eleventh Circuit unnecessarily overextends the
government's power to conduct forensic searches of an electronic device at
the border by asserting that entering the United States is a privilege, but fails
to provide any legally sound explanation for not requiring any level of
suspicion for searches protected under the Fourth Amendment.98
The Fourth Circuit's approach creates a norm for officers to conduct
manual and forensic searches based on a subjective standard, rather than an
objective standard without implicit biases. 99 Conducting searches of persons
on a subjective basis removes the ability of officers to conduct searches with
the objective interest of protecting national security. 00 Without a reasonable
suspicion standard, permitting an officer to search individuals on a subjective
basis creates the risk of the officer using implicit bias to decide which
individuals get searched, giving wide discretion to agents at the border. 1 1
For example, an officer can conduct a forensic electronic device search on
any traveler at the border, despite being employed in a professional field, not
posing a national security risk, and without being in the process of
transmitting a crime. 10 2 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit's legal standard is overly
96. See id. (emphasizing that Fourth Amendment protections are "relaxed" at the
border so much so that government officials have the utmost power to reject travelers
from entering the U.S.to protect the sovereign (citing United States v. Chemaly, 741 F.2d
1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1984)).
97. See id. (reiterating that at the border, a person's personal effects lack protection
under the Fourth Amendment).
98. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating, "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause").
99. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 807 (1996) (acknowledging that a law
enforcement's subjective intentions and perspective plays no role in ordinary probable
cause search and seizures).
100. See United States v. Kolsuz 890 F.3d 133, 147 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting that
forensic searches of electronic devices do not fit within the border search exception and
therefore need more than reasonable suspicion. The Riley court acknowledges that
forensic border searches need a warrant based on probable cause (citing Riley v.
California, 573 U.S. 373, 392 (2014))).
101. See id. at 146 (arguing that Cotterman's reasoning requires officers to make
"commonsense differentiation" between a manual and forensic search, it gives too much
discretion to an officer (citing United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 967 (2013))).
102. See Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-l1730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *7-9 (D.
Mass. May 9, 2018) (emphasizing that the January 2018 DHS electronic device border
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broad and goes beyond the border search exception.1 3
The court asserts that officers can lawfully "pat-down" and "frisk"
travelers solely because they request to cross the national border. 0 4 The
Eleventh Circuit should expand its rhetoric to include the reasoning in Riley
related to electronic device border searches because electronic devices store
personal information. 0 5 In Riley, the Supreme Court concluded that
0 6
searching a cell phone requires probable cause secured by a warrant.1
Instead, however, the Eleventh Circuit relies heavily on Ramsey, noting that
CBP agents have reasonable suspicion to search a package when it crosses
the border from known sources of illegal activity.' 0 7 For example, the
Ramsey Court noted that because Thailand was known for heroin distribution
in the United States, mail entering the country from Thailand was subject to
search without requiring reasonable suspicion. 0 8 However, the Ramsey
Court attaches a slightly favorable standard to persons traveling within the
United States border. 0 9 It concluded that travelers already in the United
States have a right to travel without interruption or search unless there is

search policy goes beyond the scope of the border exception, and completely disregards
the impact such a policy has on professionals in professional occupations and their
clients' privileged information).
103. See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1232 (1lth Cir. 2018) (stating the
court's holding that forensic border searches never require suspicion (quoting United
States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977))).
104. See United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 728 (11th Cir. 2010)
(quoting United States v. Ramos, 645 F.2d 318, 322 (5th Cir. 1981)) (stating that merely
crossing the border is enough justification for a traveler to be patted down and frisked,
no additional suspicion or cause is needed).
105. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S 373, 395 (2014) (stating that prior to the growth
of digital technology, people did not carry sensitive personal information with them on
a daily basis).
106. See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (explaining that the Supreme Court has declined to
identify the level of suspicion needed to perform a nonroutine search); see also Riley v.
California, 573 U.S. at 386 (asserting that a cell phone search requires a level of suspicion
because it does not present any sort of Chimel risk).
107. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 609-10 (1977) (explaining that the
defendant was transporting heroin from Thailand, a country known for mass-producing
and transporting heroin into the United States).
108. See id. at 614-15 (explaining that in addition to mail entering from Thailand,
there was a statute to confirm the validity of the search; therefore, even if the border
search exception did not apply, the search was valid under the statute).
109. See id. at 618 (stating that travelers and their effects outside of the United States
border need to prove that they can legally be in the United States and not be a threat to
the national security of the country).
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probable cause that the traveler is transporting contraband. 10
The Eleventh Circuit concludes that its own three-factor test for
determining the intrusiveness of a border search, established in Touset, is
irrelevant to electronic manual and forensic border searches because both are
dissimilar to an x-ray search of a person's body."' In conducting a search
of an electronic device, officers do not touch the traveler's body or use
physical force to expose the traveler's body. 12 The court incorrectly applied
the three-factor intrusiveness test because there was physical contact
between Touset and the border officer through his personal effects-the
officer touched and searched his luggage and electronic devices.'
Secondly, the test created by Touset is overly vague in that it does not specify
what it means to physically expose a traveler's intimate body parts. 1 14 The
vague language of the test, therefore, leads one to argue that an officer is
lawfully allowed to expose intimate photographs of a traveler simply by
conducting a manual search. 1 15 Specifically, the test allows an officer to
scroll through a traveler's cell phone to view intimate photographs since
under the test's language, the officer is not physically touching the

traveler. 116
Lastly, the court indicates the use of force as a prerequisite for
intrusiveness."i1 However, the court fails to acknowledge that the action of
force is subjective, difficult to measure, and based on individual factors such
as an officer's physical strength." 8 For these reasons, the Eleventh Circuit
followed a vague intrusiveness test created by Touset and disregarded that
110. See id. at 620 (noting that what CBP agents really must evaluate is incoming
persons and property, not the mode of transportation).
111. See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (listing the three-factors of the court's intrusiveness
test and analyzing how the test does not implicate any violation to the Fourth
Amendment).
112. See id. (emphasizing that because the officers in Touset did not physically touch
the defendant nor use body strip search methods to search the traveler, no intrusion of
privacy occurred).
113. See id. at 1230 (stating that a lookout was issued for Touset's return to the United
States, and when he entered the airport, a CBP agent seized his luggage and searched it).
114. See id. at 1234 (explaining that the court uses only a body search to define
"intrusive" but neglects to consider modern technology).
115. See id. at 1235 (explaining that manual searches have revealed photos of child
pornography).
116. See id. (noticing that the court fails to flush through the definition of "physical"
and uses it too loosely).
117. See id. 1234 (noting that the court affiliates force with physical strength that can
cause harm).
118. See id. (failing to provide a measure of "force").
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both manual and forensic searches of electronics at the border infringe upon
an individual's privacy interests protected under the Fourth Amendment. 19
Moreover, even if the Eleventh Circuit's reliance on the intrusiveness test
is valid, the court misapplies the factors of the test for searches conducted at
the border. 120 Specifically, the court fails to acknowledge what the Supreme
Court has already considered in Riley: with the growth of technological
advances, travelers no longer keep their personal effects at home. 121 Rather,
individuals' private documents are stored and easily accessed on their
electronic devices. 122 Thus, contrary to the court's reasoning in Touset, a
search of an individual's electronic device is intrusive under the three-factor
test because intrusiveness, force, and touching are subjective to a traveler
23

and a border officer. 1

The Eleventh Circuit also uses its precedent to analogize and conclude that
an x-ray scan of the body and a forensic search of an electronic device at the
border should not be treated the same. 124 The court correctly acknowledges
that an officer should perform an x-ray scan of a person's body when
reasonable suspicion exists. 125 However, using the courts' intrusiveness test,
an x-ray exam does encompass: (1) physical contact between a traveler and
an officer; (2) exposure of a traveler's intimate body parts; and (3) the use of
26

force. 1

119. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (restating the fundamental basis for the Fourth
Amendment resides with individual privacy interests to ones' person and personal
effects).
120. See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (stating that the factors of the intrusiveness test are
irrelevant to searches of electronic devices because the electronic device is not a physical
part of a person).
121. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396-97 (2014) (noting that today, a phone
can contain more personal information than a physical house).
122. See United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1315-16 (1lth Cir. 2018) (using
the Supreme Court's rationale that cell phones provide information never found in the
home, yet that information has a broad array of private information).
123. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996) (stating that an
officer's subjective reasoning and intent is irrelevant when determining whether an
individual is partaking in criminal behavior).
124. See United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 729 (11th Cir. 2010)
(describing that an x-ray search of persons' body requires reasonable suspicion that a
crime is being committed or the person and their effects pose a government interest risk).
125. See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (concluding that an x-ray search differs from a
forensic search of an electronic device and constitutes a nonroutine search, whereby
reasonable suspicion is required).
126. See id. (stating that even at the border, reasonable suspicion is required for highly
intrusive searches which include x-rays and strip searches).
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Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly uses the analogy of an x-ray
scan and forensic search of a cell phone. 12 7 Riley's rationale concludes that
cell phones contain intimate details of ones' life, therefore using
sophisticated scanning equipment and software to conduct a forensic
electronic device search has the same effect as searching a person's body
with an x-ray machine: both are overly intrusive privacy matters that are
inherently protected by the Fourth Amendment. 128 Because the Eleventh
Circuit
incorrectly
categorizes
electronic
devices
as
"property" or "effects," as stated in the Fourth Amendment, the court's legal
standard fails to preserve a traveler's fundamental right to privacy at the
29
border. 1
B.

The Ninth Circuit'sInterpretationandApplication of the Reasonable
Suspicion StandardPartiallyAligns with the FourthAmendment's
Protection ofPrivacy Rights, but should be Expanded to Include an
IndividualizedSuspicion StandardforElectronic Border Searches.

The Ninth Circuit's legal standard for forensic searches of electronic
devices at the border better balances an individual's privacy rights protected
by the Fourth Amendment with the government's interest in promoting
national security. 30 More importantly, the Ninth Circuit acknowledges that
there must be limits on the government's power. 13 1 However, the Ninth
Circuit's approach to forensic electronic device searches occurring at the
border has limitations. 132 Specifically, the court expects travelers to
127. See id. (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 532, 541
(1985)) (noting the Court did not decide what level of suspicion is required for a
nonroutine border strip search).
128. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 397 (2014) (explaining that the privacy
interest of searching a cell phone not only exposes the data a user regularly accesses but
data that might not be stored on the device itself For example, the traveler can have their
cell phone synced to a Cloud storage in a different location and still access more
information that is not stored on the cell phone itself).
129. See id. at 384 (referencing precedent that shows a person's personal property
includes things immediately near him during a search).
130. See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining
that it is fundamental for the court to draw a clear distinction between government
interests and individual privacy interests. The Government cannot be allowed to unjustly
seize property for extended times without justification to be used as criminal evidence
against an individual crossing the border).
131. See id. at 957 (stating that even though the government cannot be required to
have equipment readily available at the border to conduct forensic searches of electronic
devices, the government cannot simply practice an "anything goes" process).
132. See id. at 961 (explaining that an "extended" border search, commonly known
as a forensic search, is only permissible when it is apparent with reasonable certainty that
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understand that forensic searches of electronic devices can occur hundreds
of miles away from the border.' 33 This expectation unrealistically forces
travelers to inform themselves that their electronic devices are subject to a
forensic search even at a distance that is far from the border. 3 4 Even though
the Ninth Circuit makes an effort in considering a traveler's privacy rights,
it falls short by failing to establish a legal standard that objectively considers
13 5
who should be subjected to a forensic search.
The Ninth Circuit's legal standard for lawfully conducting forensic
searches of electronic devices at the border is based on reasonable suspicion
and is a two-pronged test. 3 6 First, for a forensic electronic device search to
be lawful, the traveler must have recently crossed the border, and second, the
officer must have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or
will occur.' 3 7 Similarly to the Eleventh Circuit, the legal question raised by

the Ninth Circuit's legal standard is that it still favors a subjective approach
to conducting forensic electronic device searches.' 38 The Ninth Circuit
moves closer to a balanced standard for conducting forensic searches of
electronic devices at the border. 3 9 In particular, the Ninth Circuit reasons

there was a recent border crossing and reasonable suspicion that a criminal activity is in
progress or has been committed (citing United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865,
878-79 (9th Cir. 2009))).
133. See id. at 960 (clarifying that the court's expectation exists because according to
the traditional interpretation of the border search exception, an individual loses their
privacy protection at the border).
134. See id. at 974-75 (asserting that the border search exception is not rigid and there
should not be an expectation for the United States to have forensic search equipment
readily available at each port-of-entry or border).
135. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (noting that cell phones are not
immune from search, but a warrant is generally required even when the search occurs
incident to arrest. The Court also emphasizes that cell phones are not just technological
conveniences, they hold "the privacies of life").
136. See Cotterman, 709 F.3d 961 (citing United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d
865, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2009)) (explaining the dual requirements and their establishment
to protect government interests).
137. See id. (explaining their legal standard and the overarching objective:
conforming to government needs, concluding that the sovereign does not need to make
any special justifications to search at the border).
138. See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1234 (1lth Cir. 2018) (noting that
the Fourth Circuit and Ninth Circuit both agree that reasonable suspicion is required for
"extended" forensic searches of electronic devices at the border).
139. See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 960 (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,
473 U.S. 531, 539 (1985)) (concluding that the government does not have carte blanche
at the border; therefore, the Fourth Amendment protections do not disappear at the
border).
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that when a traveler's electronic device is destroyed during or before a
forensic search, CBP agents must have reasonable suspicion before initiating
the search. 4 0
While the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have similar interpretations of the
border search exception, the Ninth Circuit properly holds that border
searches of forensic electronic devices, without reasonable suspicion, are an
intrusion on an individual's protected privacy rights. 141 Moreover, although
only relevant until after the subject or items have entered the U.S., the Ninth
Circuit's legal standard addresses not only the type of search but the distance
where the search is conducted. 142 The Ninth Circuit's legal standard asserts
that a person's expectation of privacy does not cease at the border or its
functional equivalent. 143 Therefore, when the government conducts an
extended search, inherently delayed in nature and extending beyond
the
44
actual border, it must justify the search with reasonable suspicion. 1
The Ninth Circuit erred by disagreeing with the district court's conclusion
that a traveler cannot be subject to a forensic electronic device search, if
while at the border, the government had no evidence of criminal acts in
transit. 145 Rather, to forensically search and seize a traveler's electronic
device, the government should have evidence, such as through a lookout

140. See id. at 962-63 (explaining that proximity to the border is just one factor the
court considers when enforcing the border search exception); see also United States v.
Villasenor 608 F.3d 467, 471-72 (declining to enforce the border search exception within
a few miles of the border).
141. See Cotterman, 952 F.3d at 957 (noting the intrusive nature of forensic
examinations and its Fourth Amendment implications. Moreover, the Fourth
Amendment asserts its privacy protection against intrusion when a search is conducted
beyond the border, where a traveler's normal expectation of privacy is attached).
142. See id. at 962-63 (emphasizing that a heightened level of suspicion should arise
when forensic searches of an electronic device occur away from the border or at the
border's "functional equivalent," which can extend hundreds and even thousands of
miles away from the physical border).
143. See id. at 962 (citing United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068, 1086-87 (9th
Cir. 2011) (Fletcher, J. dissenting))) (explaining that seizure of a person or their
belongings does not become unreasonable because the seizure is extended in time.
However, what really matters is the scope of their detention. The court must find that the
detention remains related to the initial search and seizure).
144. See United States v. Abbouchi, 502 F.3d 850, 855 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining
that extended searches go beyond the regular expected border search, thus requiring a
particularized level of suspicion to uncover contraband or evidence of criminal activity).
145. See Cotterman, 637 F.3d at 1074 (explaining that the United States argued that
if the border officer's initial search was based on reasonable suspicion, the officer no
longer has to justify an extended forensic border search because the original finding of
suspicion is transferred).
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146

alert, that proves that a traveler has committed a crime.
According to the Ninth Circuit, it is not necessary to dwell on the
government's border search power because the First Congress's rationale for
the Fourth Amendment has historically taken precedent: customs border
agents could conduct warrantless searches of vessels crossing the border for
contraband.147 However, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly holds in Cotterman
that a traveler's presence at the border automatically foregoes his Fourth
Amendment protections. 148 The court's holding is incorrect because a
traveler's right to privacy is not diminished the instant he presents himself at
the border. 149 Rather, being at the border should alert a traveler that his
right to privacy is less applicable, but never completely removed, because as
the court asserts, the government cannot seize property for weeks to conduct
a forensic search without first having reasonable suspicion.150 Interestingly,
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning seems to contradict itself: first it asserts that a
traveler's Fourth Amendment protection is waived at the border, but later
asserts that forensic searches require reasonable suspicion based on the
totality of the circumstances in each case. 15 1 Its reasoning must be more

146. See id. (restating the District Court's ruling: The United States does not dispute
that there was insufficient evidence to conduct a forensic search of the electronic devices
170 miles away from the border).
147. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-18 (1977) (providing an
explanation of the First Congress's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment: Section 24
authorizes custom and border officers to lawfully enter and search dwellings of
crewmembers on vessels); see also Cotterman, 637 F.3d at 1074 (stating that because
ICE agents relayed information that seemed to incriminate the defendant, the government
was allowed to conduct a forensic search of an electronic device without considering
whether they actually had evidence that established reasonable suspicion).
148. See Cotterman, 637 F.3d at 1078 (concluding that the border search exception
still applies to searches initiated at the border with devices that have not been cleared to
enter the United States. The court contends that the border search exception allows a
search to continue beyond the border to determine whether the device causes a risk to the
sovereign).
149. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 145 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Riley v.
California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)) (stating that Riley presented the notion that a cell
phone should not be treated as just another form of a container, rather, cell phones are
different: they impose a risk to expose sensitive information without probable cause).
150. See Cotterman, 637 F.3d at 1070, 1077 (claiming that if a traveler's initial search
occurs at the border, that traveler no longer has a "normal" expectation of privacy.
However, a line must be drawn: the Government cannot seize property at the border and
hold it for weeks, months, or years on a whim).
151. See id. at 1079 (quoting the court: "We continue to analyze the Government's
conduct on a case-by-cases basis" to determine when a search is unreasonable; the
reasoning should be based on the duration and scope of the search).
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uniform. 152 Through this rationale, the Ninth Circuit, similar to the Eleventh
Circuit, entirely disregards the Fourth Amendment's inherent protection
against unreasonable intrusion. 153
Cotterman, like many other travelers crossing the border, did not expect
the government to conduct a forensic electronic search of his device away
from the border without having individualized suspicion. 154 This expectation
is reasonable because the traveler has no direct knowledge of when the
155
search will cease or what the government is actually looking for.
Cotterman's argument is persuasive because it exemplifies a common
concern for travelers: travelers should not be expected to leave their personal
effects and electronic
devices at home to prevent being subject to such an
56

intrusive search. 1

C. The Fourth CircuitProperlyInterpretedandApplied the
IndividualizedSuspicion StandardBecause Using that StandardBalances
Both Government Interests and IndividualPrivacy Protection.
The individualized suspicion standard that the Fourth Circuit applies to
forensic electronic device searches at the border is the correct standard

152. See id. (providing examples of the court's reasoning being unclear).
153. See United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1310 (1 1th Cir. 2018) (concluding
that the two requirements under the Fourth Amendment to search and seize, probable
cause and a warrant, are never required at the border unless it is an x-ray examination or
strip search); see also United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1229 (1lth Cir. 2018)
(reiterating that reasonable suspicion is not required for initial search of an electronic
device at the border; therefore, no suspicion is needed to search electronic devices at the
border regardless if the search is manual or forensic); Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 967
(concluding that travelers should expect to have their privacy intruded upon during a
border search).
154. See Cotterman, 637 F.3d at 1076 (reiterating that under the border search
exception, the government can conduct searches of property away from the border not
yet cleared for entry).
155. See id. at 1074 (referencing Cotterman's argument that the border search
exception is ambiguous and allows the government to conduct forensic searches of
electronic devices without sufficient evidence and can lead to extended border searches
without reasonable particularized suspicion).
156. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 145 (4th Cir. 2018) (emphasizing that
electronic devices are found everywhere and used by everyone regardless of being a
criminal or law-abiding citizen. In addition, electronic devices are the most efficient tools
used for communication when a traveler is abroad, and it is unreasonable and unrealistic
to ask a traveler to leave his electronic devices at home because of the border search
exception); Contra United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971)
(concluding that a person should not have the same expectation of privacy at a port as
they do their home).
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because it aligns and complies with the inherent privacy protections
guaranteed in the Fourth Amendment.157 In. Kolsuz, the Fourth Circuit did
not address or resolve the level of suspicion needed in the course of a manual
electronic device search at the border. 158 Instead, the court uses Kolsuz to
address whether more than reasonable suspicion is needed to conduct
forensic electronic device searches at the border. 159 However, since the
Fourth Circuit is the only circuit that suggests that a higher level of
reasonable suspicion is needed to conduct a forensic search at the border, the
Fourth Circuit should consider addressing manual searches in future cases.16
The Fourth Circuit's determination that individualized suspicion is needed
to conduct forensic searches of electronic devices at the border serves the
Congressional intent of prioritizing government interests and protecting an
individual's right to privacy that the Fourth Amendment guarantees. 161 For
example, on two separate occasions prior to the forensic search of Kolsuz's
electronic devices, CBP agents found illegal firearm parts in his luggage and
reminded him that he needed a license to transport the parts; he did not
comply. 162 In 2016, CBP agents receivied a registered alert listing prior
border searches revealing Kolsuz's same illegal transport of firearm parts,
establishing individualized suspicion, and leading to two suitcases full of
contraband. 163 The Fourth Circuit's legal standard is compliant with the

157. See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 135 (concluding that a traveler's right to privacy does
not stop at the border. Rather, the government is required to have specific reasons to
conduct a forensic search of an electronic device based on individualized suspicion).
158. See id. at 141 (using the fact that Kolsuz did not dispute the manual search of his
electronic device at the border to justify their reasoning for not addressing manual
searches of electronic devices at the border).
159. See id. at 142 (suggesting that Kolsuz does not dispute the manual search because
he was arrested during the forensic search, which uncovered more private information
on his cell phone; whereas the manual search at the airport did not reveal information
used against him at trial).
160. See id. at 140 (stating that Riley helps to acknowledge that electronic devices
serve as property, and therefore are protected by the Fourth Amendment).
161. See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1236 (11th Cir. 2018)
(acknowledging the Congressional intent of the border search exception: officers are
required to have reason to suspect contraband is being imported); See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d
at 137 (agreeing with Riley: forensically searching an electronic device requires more
than reasonable suspicion).
162. See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 141 (explaining that Kolsuz did not contest or reject the
fact that his electronic devices were seized, he also had prior knowledge of the licensing
requirements to transport such fire arm parts and never complied).
163. See id. at 143 (explaining that CBP agents rightfully forensically searched
Kolsuz's phone because they had good reason (his history) to believe that he would
continue transporting illegal fire arm parts).
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Fourth Amendment because a forensic search of electronic devices requires
the government to produce a greater justification for conducting the
search.'64 In Kolsuz, the court applied an individualized suspicion standard
and thereby correctly rejected the defendant's argument against the forensic
search.165 Kolsuz argued that because he was exiting the United States, the
border search exception did not apply, but he is incorrect. 166 Moreover,
Kolsuz's continuous efforts to transport illegal weapon-parts speaks directly
to the basis of the border search exception which aims to prevent dangerous
contraband from entering the United States. 16 7 In hindsight, the Fourth
Circuit recognizes that even at the border, the government's authority is
limited because electronic device searches must be subject to
reasonableness. 168 The Fourth Circuit's legal standard is an example of an
objective legal standard that correctly balances both government and
personal interests because it acknowledges that a forensic search at the
border reveals sensitive and private information. 169 In addition, the Fourth
Circuit relies on precedent that acknowledges cell phone searches go beyond
the normal expected standard of intrusion.' 0 In 2012, CBP agents
discovered 163 illegal firearms in Kolsuz's luggage; the firearms were added
to the United States Munitions List (hereinafter "USML"). 17 1 To add a
164. See id. (agreeing with the District Court's holding but adding that perhaps there
must be a higher warrant-based rule for nonroutine searches of electronic devices at the
border, suggesting that maybe a warrant-based standard should be developed).
165. See id. at 138 (describing the long history of the defendant's criminal activity.
When the defendant attempted to exit the United States, he was already "well known" to
government authorities for exporting fire arm parts without an export license).
166. See id. (asserting the basis of the border search exception is to protect against
national security risks, which give way to regulating imports and exports).
167. See id. (explaining that the purpose of the border search exception is to monitor
the transport of dangerous weapons).
168. See id. (emphasizing that the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness to search and seize).
169. See id. at 140 (explaining that a manual search of an electronic device requires
no level of suspicion because such a search is implied for travelers entering and existing
the border. However, a forensic search, whereby a cell phone is seized from its owner,
connected to a sophisticated piece of equipment which is developed to analyze and
extract data beyond a manual search, can no longer be compared to an ordinary search
of ones' luggage).
170. See id. (stating that Supreme Court precedent has acknowledged the difficulties
in categorizing a forensic search of a cell phone as just a manual search; instead, the
Court concluded that such a search is easily comparable to a "body cavity search" of a
phone).
171. See id. at 138 (explaining that under the Arms Export Control Act, firearm parts
are considered defense articles subject to licensing requirements).
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weapon to the USML, the government must have a justified reason that the
weapon itself is a national security risk. 17 2 The Fourth Circuit's legal
standard for forensic searches complies with the Fourth Amendment because
it requires border officials to have specific reasons to conduct such a search,
17
like the defendant's long history of transporting illegal contraband.
Additionally, following Kolsuz's arrest, the forensic search of his cell phone
revealed information showing that he intended to continue transporting
illegal firearms. 174
Moreover, without a legal standard based on
individualized suspicion, CBP agents are searching travelers based on a
subjective standard. 175 Having a legal standard based on individualized
suspicion prevents the government from having free rein to unequivocally
forensically search without reason.17 6 In turn, this will produce an interestbalanced standard that reduces 177
Fourth Amendment violation claims of
"unreasonable search or seizure.''
In Kolsuz, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit's holding that
after an electronic device search is initiated at the border, proximity is no
longer an issue. 17 8 The Fourth Circuit has also taken an approach that
respects governmental interest, an individual's right to privacy, and its

172. See id.at 139 (explaining that once a weapon is added to the United States
Munitions List, it cannot be removed from the United States without a license).
173. See id. at 138 (describing the long list of encounters and warning border officers
had with the defendant prior to the forensic search of his electronic devices. The
encounters occurred for a number of years).
174. See id. at 143 (providing the explanation that the forensic search showed ongoing
efforts to continue transporting illegal firearms to Miami and Turkey from the United
States).
175. See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1232 (1 1th Cir. 2018) (asserting that
there is no need for an extended legal standard to incorporate specific reasons to conduct
a forensic search).
176. See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 135 (explaining that there needs to be a balanced
objective standard for Fourth Amendment exceptions. Moreover, when an individual's
privacy interests outweigh government interests, a warrant based on probable cause is
required).
177. See id. at 141 (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541
(1985)) (explaining that courts have justified the most intrusive nonroutine searches with
reasonable suspicion, including the case where the Court used an x-ray to ensure that a
suspect was smuggling drugs, and detained the criminal until the drugs was excreted
from her alimentary canal).
178. See id. at 142 (citing United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 961-62 (2013))
(concluding once an electronic device search started at the border, conducting an off-site
forensic search away from the actual border is permissible and does not remove the
border exception).
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extension to property, including electronic devices. 17 9 The Fourth Circuit's
legal standard is in line with the Fourth Amendment's privacy protection
because it requires the government to demonstrate significant proof that an
individual is in transit to commit a crime before being able to conduct a
forensic search.180
The interesting nuance between the circuit courts is that all suggest that
the legislative and executive branches of government further examine the
issue and implications of electronic device searches at the border.' 8 ' They
recommend that Congress use its law-making power to create an objective
82
standard to determine the level of suspicion required for border searches. 1
By adopting the Fourth Circuit's rationale, circuit courts will be able to
properly apply Riley's individualized suspicion standard instead of applying
a reasonable suspicion standard, or failing to apply a standard at all when
performing nonroutine-forensic electronic device searches at the border.183
A standard based on individualized suspicion is more effective; it serves as
a safeguard for travelers and allows CBP agents to properly investigate
actual risks to national security based on individual suspicion, rather than
subjective beliefs. 81 4 An individualized suspicion standard ensures that the
individual subjected to the search is guaranteed protection over his private
interests, such as his political affiliations, religious views, location, and
179. See id. at 143 (explaining that when a Fourth Amendment search exception is
applicable and there are ancillary governmental interests, the court must enforce the
paramount protection described in the Fourth Amendment, the government must obtain
a warrant based on probable cause).
180. See id. (explaining that CBP agents found two suitcases of firearm parts and did
not just search Kolsuz's belongings to invoke the border exception to generalized law
enforcement interests and combating crime).
181. See id. at 148 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (emphasizing that different standards
of suspicion should be determined by Congress and courts should apply it. In addition,
because border searches of electronic devices are becoming more common, all three
branches of government need to approach the topic, not just one).
182. See id. at 148(emphasizing that the legislative and executive branches of
government have a critical role in defining the standard for border searches and therefore,
are better equipped to create rules that govern individual privacy rights and governmental
interests).
183. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 374 (2014) (emphasizing that a search of
a cell phone does not further the government interests in Chimel but has a greater privacy
interest than a brief physical search).
184. See id. at 394 (explaining the justification for expanding the standard of
suspicion for cell phone searches: a cell phones' storage capacity has consequences that
raise several privacy concerns. A cell phone collects and stores information such as
personal contacts, addresses, financial and medical records, and thousands of
photographs that show a person's private life).
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browsing history. 8 5 Moreover, manual routine searches are already
exempted from the standard Fourth Amendment requirements: probable
cause and a warrant; therefore, CBP agents are free to assess risks concerning
national security and safety without having to forensically search an
86

electronic device. 1

Having courts recognize the importance of individualized suspicion is
useful but not enough.'1 7 The inconsistencies between circuit courts
regarding forensic electronic device searches directly infringe on the primary
purpose of the Fourth Amendment: to protect against government
intrusion.' 8 As a result, it becomes cumbersome and difficult for travelers
and law enforcement officers to understand when to proceed with such a
search.8 9 Furthermore, because the Fourth Circuit, like its sister circuits,
chose not to address manual searches, the individualized suspicion standard
is still vague because no standard objective test exists for border officials to
use. 190 Therefore, any search can be considered manual or forensic. 19 1
Moreover, the concurring opinion in Kolsuz emphasizes the need to resolve
empirical questions that will help create an objective legal standard

185. See id. at 396 (citing Justice Sotomayor's point of view: cell phones contain
particularized information that is meant to be kept private).
186. See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 135 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment is broad
enough to prevent contraband without having to forensically search when individualized
suspicion is absent).
187. See id. at 133 (referring to circuit cases that disagree on the legal standard of the
border search exception).
188. See generally United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227 (1lth Cir. 2018), Kolsuz,
890 F.3d at 133, United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing the
circuit court cases that differ on the standard of suspicion needed to conduct a forensic
electronic device search at the border or its functional equivalent).
189. See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 148 (Wilkinson, J., concurring)(noting that if, as the
majority declares, individualized suspicion is required to conduct a forensic search of an
electronic at the border, then Congress must say so. Moreover, issues like border searches
are the reason why the government must be active in the separation of powers; all
branches of government must participate in such a policy, "not just one").
190. See id. at 146 (explaining that at this point, even though CBP implemented the
Border Search of Electronic Devices directive, it does not establish a constitutional
mandate).
191. See id. at 148-49 (noting that even though the majority chose not to address
manual searches at the border, individualized suspicion can apply to manual searches as
well. Moreover, the majority should have found that the forensic search was reasonable,
rather than allowing the distinction of intrusive and less intrusive be the deciding factor
in whether or not individualized suspicion was present because such distinction allows
for slipperiness).
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minimizing tension between privacy and security interest at the border. 192
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

With the advance of modem technology and the new administration,
electronic device searches at the border have increased to almost 15,000 in
the first half of 2017, and is estimated to triple at the end 2017.193 The border
search exception's purpose is to protect the sovereign from national security
risks, yet it is proven that the exception encroaches upon, and on occasion
can violate an individual's privacy interest. 194 Courts drastically vary with
their interpretations of the border search exception and need an objective
legal standard to evaluate cases based on the border search exception. 195 In
deciding what an objective legal standard would be, the legislative branch
should utilize the Fourth Circuit's standard for forensic searches and
incorporate the Eleventh Circuit's three-factor intrusiveness analysis. 196
Moreover, the legislative branch should strictly review this exception and
197
objectively create a standard for manual and forensic searches.

192. See id. at 150 (stating specific questions that are critical to answer in order to
establish an objective legal standard).
193. See American Civil Liberties Union, Alasaad v. Nielsen: Challenge to
Warrantless Phone and Laptop Searches at US. Border, THE AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION (Nov. 17, 2018, 12:47 AM), https://www.aclu.org/cases/alasaad-vnielsen-challenge-warrantless-phone-and-laptop-searches-us-border
(addressing the
recent trend of border searches of electronic devices and its effect on professionals who
cross the border).
194. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014) (acknowledging that cell
phones differ from other physical objects because they store an immense amount of
information that is readily available upon a warrantless search).
195. See generally United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1229 (1lth Cir. 2018),
Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 133, United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068, 1070 (9th Cir. 2011)
(showing how each circuit court applied the border search exception to forensic searches
of electronic devices differently).
196. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 408 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring) (stating
that with the growth of modern day technology, it would be "very unfortunate" if in the
twenty-first century, privacy protection of electronic devices was left for the federal
courts to analyze using only the "blunt" instrument of the Fourth Amendment. Noting
that the legislative branch is in a better place to determine a standard, objective
assessment to handle electronic device border searches); see also Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 150
(agreeing with the suggestion that the legislative and executive branches of government
are better equipped to create a standard test because they are elected by the people).
197. See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 149 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the
only responsibility of the judicial branch is to apply the law to the facts of the case; to do
so, the legislative and executive branches must use their power to create an objective
standard).
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Reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard for manual border searches
because, while CBP agents are entrusted to protect government interests,
they should only initiate a manual search when they are notified that a
traveler is a suspect to a crime or is in the process of committing a crime. 198
Additionally, for a forensic electronic device search, the standard of
suspicion should be individualized suspicion, based on specific facts. 199
The overly broad language of DHS's electronic device border search
policy allows the government to overextend their power, hence the difficulty
for circuit courts to agree on when, where, how, and why a traveler's
electronic devices are subject to a manual or forensic border search. 20 0 This
kind of inconsistent policy creates an environment where travelers and law
enforcement officers argue against one another and their prospective privacy
interests. 20 '
Factors such as: whether a traveler has a history of criminal behavior, the

kind of criminal charges, the type of electronic device, and the ways in which
officers conduct the search, are fundamental questions that help to create an
objective standard.20 2
Moreover, the correct legal standard for manual
searches of electronic devices is reasonable suspicion and individualized
20 3
suspicion for forensic searches of electronic devices at the border.

198. See id. at 139 (noting that even a manual search of an electronic device can be
intrusive: a manual search involves using the iPhone's touch screen feature to scroll
through recent calls and text messages).
199. See id. at 133 (stating that extended border searches are nonroutine searches, thus
requiring the individual to be subjected to more personal intrusion of their private effect;
such a search requires individualized suspicion); see also Cotterman, 637 F.3d at 1079
(referencing Supreme Court precedent to establish that the manner in which an initial
border search is conducted may require a heightened degree of suspicion, whereby even
an initial search can be unreasonable).
200. See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1229 (concluding that searches of electronic devices at
the border never require probable cause or a warrant. Moreover, no suspicion is required
to search electronic devices at the border, regardless of the search being manual or
forensic); Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 133 (concluding that individualized suspicion is required
to forensically search an electronic device at the border); Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 968
(concluding that reasonable suspicion is needed to conduct a forensic search of an
electronic device at the border).
201. See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 148 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (acknowledging the
importance of having a third governmental branch, the Legislature, create a rule that is
objective for the courts to apply).
202. See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (using Touset to inspire a standardized, objective
test).
203. See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 135 (asserting that nonroutine searches deeply intrude
on a person's privacy, thus requiring individualized suspicion); see also Riley v.
California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (emphasizing that today, technology allows an
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CONCLUSION

A Fourth Amendment exception that does not have an objective legal
standard to assess whether a constitutional violation has occurred is useless
to the judiciary branch and gambles with government and individual privacy
interests.20 4 An objective legal standard should not give the government an
individual preference, rather it should limit power discretion between both
parties and formulate a test whereby any court can effectively apply factors
that result in an unbiased showing of the facts and the law.20 5 The Fourth
Circuit attempts to create an objective standard test for forensic searches of
electronic devices by concluding that individualized suspicion is needed for
such a search; however, this standard must be established through the
legislative body.20 6

individual to carry personal information by hand and does not allow for a lesser
protection of privacy; a warrant is still generally required and obtaining a warrant is also
easier for law enforcement because they can receive warrants electronically).
204. See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 137 (explaining the importance of having a different
level of suspicion when conducting an electronic device search at the border); see United
States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining three different
types of border searches and the level of suspicion needed to search).
205. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 407-088 (Alito, J., concurring) and Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at
148 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (emphasizing the need for the legislative and executive
branch to step-in and produce a law that evaluates the border search exception).
206. See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 149 (noting that if an objective standardized test is
created by federal courts, there will be a slippery slope ahead).
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